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Abstract—The notion of tacit knowledge has been widely and

diversely adopted in the knowledge management literature. It
is used to cover knowledge which hasn’t yet been articulated
as well as knowledge which various authors argue cannot ever
be articulated. This paper seeks to review these differences
and proposes a conceptual means of understanding the issues
associated with tacit knowledge. It draws on the work of
Collins and Kusch to introduce notions of polimorphic and
mimeomorphic actions before raising implications for the
practice of knowledge management.
A. Introduction
The study of human knowledge has been a central subject
matter of philosophy and epistemology since the Ancient
Greeks. Western philosophers have often argued that
knowledge is “justified true belief”, a concept that was first
introduced by Plato in his Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus [1].
The topic of knowledge has begun to gain a new wave of
attention in recent years.
This is partly due to
computerisation, and in particular studies into artificial
intelligence and technologies to manage and maintain the
knowledge found in organisations [2].
Within the literature on the management of knowledge, the
concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ has become predominant.
Nonaka and Takeuchi [1] have defined tacit knowledge as
“personal knowledge embedded in individual experience and
involves intangible factors such as personal belief, perspective
and value system” [1, p. vii]. They contrast this to the other
kind of knowledge, ‘explicit knowledge’, which “can be
articulated in formal language including grammatical
statements, mathematical expressions, specifications, manuals
and so forth” [1, p. viii]. Howells [3] connects tacit knowledge
more directly with the performance of skills, and defines it as
“non–codified, disembodied know–how that is acquired via the
informal take–up of learned behaviour and procedure” [3, p.
92]. In this reading, tacit knowledge is seen as a major barrier
to the encapsulation of human knowledge in artificially
intelligent machines [4] [5].
The concept of tacit knowing was (re) introduced by the
scientist turned philosopher, Michael Polanyi, in the 1950s.

The starting point for Polanyi’s philosophical argument was
the notion that “we know more than we can tell” [6, p. 4].
Since then, the term has been appropriated by other authors
and ‘translated’ [7] to fit their own particular needs and ideas.
Polanyi used it for philosophical reasoning about the nature
and justification of scientific knowledge. In contrast, these
other authors try to use it in more diverse and purposeful ways.
This pragmatic approach to the term has resulted in
considerable inconsistency and confusion in how the term is
used. The purpose of this paper is to review the different ways
in which the term ‘tacit knowledge’ has been used comparing
them with the initial proposal made by Polanyi. It then
proposes a new vocabulary and conceptual framework for
addressing the issues of tacit and explicit knowledge which can
be of benefit to the information systems and knowledge
management community.
The following section will briefly illustrate the range of ways
in which the term has been used, showing the increasingly
diverse ways in which “knowing more than we can tell” has
been interpreted. This discourse is then contrasted with
Polanyi’s own use of the term. The paper then draws on the
distinctions made by Collins and Kusch, who present a theory
of the shape of actions which helps clarify what we mean by
tacit knowledge. Their theory allows us to integrate Polanyi’s
initial ideas with the more recent examples found in the
knowledge management literature.
B. Tacit knowledge in the knowledge management literature
In many instances, the literature on knowledge management
is particularly vague about what is meant by tacit knowledge,
drawing instead on some of the attributes which might shape
it. In so doing it is typically contrasted with explicit knowledge
which can be readily coded for manipulation by computer based
systems. For example, Grant and Gregory [8] suggest that
knowledge is tacit if it is embedded in the context of an
individual’s skill or it involves high speed and simultaneous
information processing, which cannot be slowed down or
practised slowly or it involves the recognition of wholes
(gestalts) which relies on the awareness of diffuse, subsidiary
clues or the complex nature of the skill is lost in language,
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which cannot serve to describe relationships and characterise
the entities related [8, p. 153].
Explicit knowledge, therefore does not rely on wholes, is not
lost in language and can be performed at a relatively slow
speed.
In contrast, Hutchins [9] suggests that many of these
attributes of knowledge are not found solely in individuals, but
rather are distributed through a social workgroup, which
works together (and with technical artifacts) to undertake the
kinds of activities described by Grant and Gregory. Tacitness,
then, is enabled by the group (more accurately, the
socio–technical imbroglio) rather than the individual.
Another description of tacit knowledge is presented by
Zander and Zander (in [3]) who assert that tacit know–how is
articulable under certain circumstances: when the pace of
performance is slow and pace variations are tolerable, when a
standardised, controlled context for the performance is
assured, and when the performance as a whole can be
simplified to basic interactions.
Even when there is general agreement that tacit knowledge
is knowledge that resides “in the heads” of people, there are
still different interpretations of why that knowledge must
reside there. The two extremes on this debate are found in the
‘difficulty’ and the ‘de facto’ schools. Scholars belonging to
the dominant difficulty school argue that tacit knowledge is
difficult (but not in theory impossible) to articulate and
formalise. Knowledge that does not face this difficulty is (or
could be) articulated, formalised and codified. Thus, Zander
and Zander suggest the conditions under which tacit
knowledge could be made explicit, arguing that it is difficult
to make tacit knowledge explicit when it is found in a varied
context and where the performance whole is not
decomposable.
Hansen et al. [10] make much the same point “(E)xplicit
knowledge is knowledge that can be codified” and “(T)acit
knowledge ... is difficult to articulate in writing and is
acquired through personal experience” [10, p. 115]. They then
use this distinction to provide advice on how to manage
knowledge in the organisation: if much of the knowledge in an
organisation is tacit then they suggest that it is not worth
trying to make it explicit and the organisation should instead
enable all parts of the organisation to have access to the
experts with the tacit knowledge.
Some other examples of the difficulty school include Fleck
[11] who says that tacit knowledge is “not ... readily
articulable and therefore not easily communicable or tradable”
[11, p. 388]. Howells [3] similarly maintains that tacit
knowledge is “difficult to codify, standardise and transfer” [3,
p. 103] and “not easily embodied in a blueprint or operating
manual” [3, p. 97]. Nonaka and Takeuchi [1] state similarly
that tacit knowledge is “hard to formalise and communicate to
others” [1, p. 238]. They maintain, however, that tacit
knowledge can be articulated most of the time, although

sometimes this is done through the use of metaphors rather
than directly.
In contrast, the de facto school equates tacit knowledge with
uncodified knowledge and opposes it to codified knowledge
[12][13]. Boisot [13] asserts that “the issue is one of choosing
which items to make tacit and which to ones to codify” [13, p.
492] suggesting that the problem is not one of difficultly, but
rather is simply one of choice of where to focus attention.
Alavi and Leidner [14] hold a similar view and argue that
knowledge becomes tacit once it is processed in the mind of an
individual, and that this tacit knowledge becomes explicit again
“once it is communicated to others in the form of text,
computer output, spoken or written words, or other means” [14,
p. 6].
Dutta and Weiss [15] state that “(C)odified knowledge is
amenable to the printed page and can easily be transmitted,
such as in designs and specifications, and is therefore less
proprietary than tacit knowledge, which is far more difficult to
codify and hence difficult to imitate” [15, p. 345]. They thus
make an important clarification for the de facto school, namely
that codified knowledge is equivalent to explicit knowledge.
The very different uses of the term can now be seen and,
whilst there is no inherent problem with a diverse vocabulary
for describing these phenomena, at times terminological
flexibility does lead to more problems than it resolves. The
first use of the term tacit knowledge is associated with
knowledge that has not yet been formalised. Thus tacit
knowledge is a subset of all knowledge consisting of those
items that have not (yet) been made explicit. A second use of
the term is associated with knowledge which cannot be
formalised. There are two sub–categories here. The first
argues that some knowledge cannot be formalised because the
knowledge is embodied. The second argues that it cannot be
formalised because of fundamental characteristics of the nature
of the knowledge. A further suggestion is that some human
abilities are simply beyond our knowledge. However, this
paper would suggest that rather than being unknowable they
are simply of a form that is not amenable to expression using
our conventional, reductionistic forms and hence are subsumed
under the second sub–category. Table 1 shows these different
forms.
Type of tacit knowledge

Typical reason

Knowledge that has not yet
been formalised

Because of cost / time
limitations

Knowledge that cannot be
formalised

Because it is embodied
Because of the form of the
knowledge

Table 1: Different types of tacit knowledge
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Creating such a table carries with it the risk of grossly
oversimplifying the situation. Is the reason why the
knowledge has not yet been formalised because, in fact, it
relies on embodied skills or uses a form of knowledge that
cannot be formalised? Similarly, is it accurate to really say
that knowledge cannot be formalised because it is embodied,
or is it simply the case that it has not yet been formalised
because our tools and means of representation are not
particularly suited to embodied knowledge. This notion is
supported by Nelson and Winter [16] who state that “(w)hether
a particular bit of knowledge is in principle articulable or
necessarily tacit is not the relevant question in most behavioral
situations. Rather, the question is whether the costs associated
with the obstacles to articulation are sufficiently high so that
the knowledge in fact remains tacit” [16, p. 82]. The third
situation, namely that there are forms of knowledge that
cannot be formalised and articulated will be supported below.
In order to try and clarify this situation, it might be helpful
to first return to Polanyi’s original ideas to see how he used the
term tacit knowledge, before seeing how other authors have
addressed the question of what knowledge can and cannot be
made explicit.
C. Tacit knowledge according to Polanyi
Michael Polanyi argues from a philosophical point of view,
and enquires into the nature and justification of scientific
knowledge. The central point of Polanyi’s argument is, as has
been mentioned, that “we know more than we can tell” [6,
p.4]. In the light of the previous discussion, however, it would
be useful to try and understand what kinds of things Polanyi
thought we couldn’t tell and what he felt were the reasons for
this inability.
Perhaps his most famous example of tacit knowledge is the
ability to ride a bicycle [17]. This is an interesting example
because it combines the different categories described in table
1. “If I know how to ride a bicycle..., this does not mean that
I can tell how I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle... .
I may not have the slightest idea of how I do this, or even an
entirely wrong or grossly imperfect idea of it, and yet go on
cycling ... merrily. Nor can it be said that I know how to
bicycle... and yet do not know how to co–ordinate the complex
pattern of muscular acts by which I do my cycling... . I both
know how to carry out (this performance) as a whole and also
know how to carry out the elementary acts which constitute
(it), although I cannot tell what these acts are” [18, p. 4].
It is hardly surprising, then, that the knowledge
management literature is so confused. In this short extract,
Polanyi has shown how the knowledge involved in riding a
bicycle has not been made explicit, involves an embodied skill
and cannot easily be articulated. He adds to the confusion
when he states: “(I)n order to compensate for a given angle of
imbalance (") we must take a curve on the side of the
imbalance, of which the radius (r) should be proportionate to

the square of the velocity (v) over the imbalance r~v2/"” [18,
pp. 6–7], thus suggesting that riding a bike whilst tacit in his
understanding, could consist of explicit knowledge.
However, he argues, such knowledge is ineffectual, unless
known tacitly. We cannot learn how to keep our balances on
a bicycle solely by studying this formula. It does not even help
us in the slightest, unless we were building a bike–balancing
robot. “Tacit knowing is the fundamental power of the mind
which creates explicit knowing, lends meaning to it and
controls its uses” [18, p. 18].
He argues that a sharp division between tacit and explicit
(“capable of being clearly stated” [18, p. 16]) knowledge does
not exist. “Tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all
knowledge” [19, p.20]. Even if knowledge has been articulated
into words or mathematical formulas, this explicit knowledge
must rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence “all
knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge” [18, p.
7 emphasis in original]. A wholly explicit knowledge, he
argues, is unthinkable. “(A) mathematical theory can ...
function as a theory only within an act of tacit knowing” [19,
p. 21]. In so doing, he emphasises the “knower’s active
participation in any act of knowing” [18, p. 4].
Thus, if the knowledge management literature were to stay
true to Polanyi, then it would have to acknowledge the
fundamental role that tacit knowledge plays in all human
knowledge–based activity. In order to deal with this
background understanding which is needed to make sense of
any knowledge, we need an explanation of why we can, in
operational situations, ignore many of the issues associated
with it. In the same way that we assume a certain level of
literacy when writing computer manuals, so we can be
indifferent to a certain level of tacit knowledge that is required
to enable us to use any form of more explicit knowledge. In the
next section, a new way of studying the shape of actions is
introduced which specifically deals with this area of
indifference.
D. The shape of actions
A recent theoretical attempt to understand what is meant by
tacit knowledge is provided by Collins and Kusch [20] who
describe what they call “the shape of actions” which provides
a categorisation of actions which can, in principle, be made
explicit and hence performed by machines, and those which
remain entirely within the realm of humans. They do this by
distinguishing between polimorphic and mimeomorphic
actions.
They use the term action in contrast to behaviour, where
behaviours are “any sequence of bodily movements” [20, p. 31].
Actions are always associated in one way or another with
intentions: action = behaviour+intention.
Given this
intentional element, it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that
there is a direct link between knowledge and the action it is
associated with.
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Mimeomorphic actions are then actions which we “either
seek to or are content to carry out in pretty much the same
way, in terms of behaviour, on different occasions” [20, p. 31].
An example of a mimeomorphic action is switching on a light.
We are behaviourally indifferent to how this action is
performed, in that we do not care whether this action is
performed with our right or left hand, with quick or slow
movements, and so forth. Thus, the (in Polanyi’s terms)
background tacit knowledge needed to be able to perform this
action is not important.
We can therefore define
mimeomorphic knowledge as that knowledge which is needed
to successfully perform such actions.
Polimorphic actions are characterised by the fact that they
usually involve varying behaviour to carry out the same action
in relation to a situation. This is due to the fact that a
polimorphic action “takes its shape from society” [20, p. 37].
An example of a polimorphic action is telling a joke. We
expect to perform this action differently on each occasion,
since in performing the action we have to interact with the
society in which the action is embedded. We are therefore not
behaviourally indifferent to how this action is performed and
the knowledge required to successfully perform the action can
therefore be labelled as polimorphic knowledge. There is a
direct link here to Wittgenstein’s ideas of language [21] [22],
ideas which have shaped much of Collins’ earlier work (see,
for example, [23]).
This can be shown diagrammatically. Figure 1 shows how
a particular action can be implemented through various
behaviours. We need to choose which behaviour to use and
the appropriateness of the choice depends on the society we are
dealing with.

Figure 1 Polimorphic
action

Figure 2 Mimeomorphic
action

With mimeomorphic actions, we are indifferent as to which
behaviour is used, although the range of possible behaviours
will vary from situation to situation, see figure 2.
The crucial point in their argument is that polimorphic
actions cannot, as a matter of principle, be learned except
through socialisation or apprenticeship; through “embedding

within society” [20, p. 88]. “To learn how to interact with a
society, one has to interact with that very society” [20, p. 88].
Mimeomorphic actions, in contrast, can be learned in other
ways. The formula for a mimeomorphic action, provided it is
not impossibly complex, can be “inscribed in temporarily
decontextualised form, and is therefore transferable in a more
straightforward way” [20, p. 86].
However, if a mimeomorphic action is complex, it is also
(like a polimorphic action) most easily transferred through
socialisation or apprenticeship, because this is a way in which
humans have become adept at learning complex skills. This
means that it is often difficult to determine whether an action
(and the knowledge that underlies it) is polimorphic or
mimeomorphic by observing how it is learned.
E. Tacit knowledge and polimorphic knowledge
The distinction that Collins and Kusch make, can be usefully
illustrated by reconsidering the example of bike riding that
Polanyi introduced.
Riding a bicycle without interaction with traffic Collins and
Kusch call “bike balancing”.
Bike balancing is a
mimeomorphic action because we are behaviourally indifferent
to how the action is carried out. However, “(e)ven if the
formula for bike balancing is already known to engineers, our
brains are not fast enough to cope with learning to bike balance
by applying the formula” [20, p. 87]. Learning how to bike
balance is therefore achieved through learning by doing, on a
bicycle, in the “real world”.
Riding a bicycle through traffic, on the other hand, is a
polimorphic action because in performing the action we have
to interact with the society in which it is embedded, and
because we therefore are not behaviourally indifferent to how
the action is performed. This can be easily verified by trying to
ride a bike in a country one is not familiar with.
Even if “bike balancing” and “riding a bicycle through
traffic” are both learned in essentially the same way
(socialisation/apprenticeship; learning by doing, in the “real
world”), there is however, Collins and Kusch argue, a
principled difference between how these different actions.
They explain: “(W)e could build a bike balancing
simulator—something like an aircraft simulator—and learn to
balance a bike without ever having sat on one. It just happens
that no one thinks this a worthwhile thing to do” [20, p. 86].
If this were done, however, this would mean that “bike
balancing” could be learned without embedding within society,
the “real world”.
In contrast, polimorphic actions, Collins and Kusch argue,
cannot, as a matter of principle, be learned without embedding
within society, because “societies cannot be simulated” [20, p.
86] (for more on this, see Collins [24], especially chapters 13
and 14). Advice and instructions may aid the mastery of
polimorphic actions, but the advice cannot replace experience.
“For a set of instructions covering a polimorphic action to be so
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complete that it could not be misunderstood by an unsocialised
entity, it would need to anticipate all the social circumstances
with which the skilled practitioner must operate” [20, p. 86].
It is important to emphasise that the behaviours associated
with polimorphic actions can still be performed without this
socialisation: it is possible to tell a joke at a funeral and it is
also possible for this to be, by chance, the most appropriate
thing to do. This does not make it a polimorphic action.
F. Conclusions
This paper has shown that knowledge management
literature uses the term “tacit knowledge” in an inconsistent
and confused way. The concept is defined in broad terms, and
the attributes that various scholars attach to it show that their
perceptions of the concept often are contradictory. The
knowledge management literature’s use of the term can
essentially be divided in two different “schools”: the “difficulty
school” and the “de facto school.” Some authors maintain that
tacit knowledge is knowledge that is difficult to articulate or
formalise, while others seem to suggest that all knowledge is
tacit, as long as it has not yet de facto been
articulated/formalised. This ambivalence is reflected in other
terminology within the theoretical framework in which tacit
knowledge is situated. Explicit knowledge—all knowledge
that is not tacit—is predominantly thought of as knowledge
that is possible (or “easy”) to articulate or formalise. Some
authors use the term “codified knowledge” instead of “explicit
knowledge” for all knowledge that is not tacit. Some of these
scholars equate codified knowledge with knowledge that de
facto has been articulated/written down (in accordance with
the “de facto school”), while others refer to it as knowledge
that is “amenable to the written page,” or codifiable (in
accordance with the “difficulty school”).
This review has shown that knowledge management
scholars have, in applying the tacit knowledge concept to their
particular area of research, sometimes taken advantage of the
nebulosity of the concept to stretch it in ways that are
advantageous to them. One streak the knowledge management
scholars do have in common, however, is that they seek to
draw a clear dividing line between tacit and explicit
knowledge. This means that the knowledge management
literature’s perception of “tacit knowledge” does not fully
correspond to Polanyi’s. Polanyi’s philosophical argument
was that tacit knowing is an indispensable part of all
knowledge, and that making a sharp division between tacit and
explicit knowledge is not possible, or meaningful. The fact
that knowledge management scholars, in using the term tacit
knowledge actually distance themselves from Polanyi’s use of
the term (tacit knowing) is not recognised in the literature.
Collins and Kusch help address this point by introducing the
notion of behavioral indifference whereby a certain level of
tacit knowing can be accepted, without having an impact on
the wider question of what is tacit and what is explicit. The

paper introduced their distinction between polimorphic and
mimeomorphic actions to see whether it could be used to clarify
the tacit/explicit distinction and introduce a criteria for
differentiating between different types of knowledge. The
polimorphic / mimeomorphic distinction was shown to be
particularly applicable in discussions addressing what
knowledge / skills that could / should be captured in machines,
in order to replace human skills. When discussing the
human–to–human transfer of skills, however, it is often the
case that polimorphic and complex mimeomorphic skills are
transferred in the same way, since in both cases human mastery
rests upon tacit knowledge.
Thus the shape of actions allows us to make clear theoretical
distinctions between different kinds of actions, which embody
knowledge which has been described as tacit and that which
has been described as explicit. Given the complex, interrelated
nature of all human activities, empirical studies will be needed
to determine the extent to which particular organisational
actions are classifiable as either polimorphic and
mimeomorphic actions. One possible solution would be to
draw on Callon’s analysis of the role of market forces [25] as
a mechanism for circumscribing different kinds of activity in
complex situations and allowing organisations to differentiate
between the knowledge and skills that are easily traded in the
open labour market, with that knowledge and skills which is
specific to the organisational culture of the firm and provides
a source of competitive advantage.
Despite this inherent complexity of the human condition,
this analysis helps in understanding the different kinds of
knowledge and actions found in organisations. From this it is
feasible to determine the kinds of support and control needed
by different parts of the organisation [26]: thus the work of an
computer support technician requires different kinds of support
from that of a personal assistant to the managing director.
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